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Abstract 
This thesis explores issues of sectarianism and sectarian rheotric within the 
Gulf region. It attempts to understand phenomena of sectarianism through an 
interdisciplinary approach, including discussions related to politics, economics, 
religion, and identity. Processes of state formation, the economics of rentierism, and 
the mismanagement of identity have all contributed to the hieghtened levels of 
sectarianism observable in the Gulf today. The outcomes of this sectarianism have 
been farreaching, and include a decrease in real political engagement by shi'a in the 
Gulf, and a turn to social and new media to express political dissent and to organize 
along secatrian lines. The idea that shi'a are inherently more receptive to social and 
new media is explored through a comparative study of internet use in Iran. This 
thesis also draws conclusions about sectarian contentobserved in the Gulfvia social 
media, presenting findings from original data collection. 
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Introduction 
Social media use by shi'a clerical institutions is undoubtedly on the rise. In 
the 21st century it is not uncommon for various shi'a clerics based in and around 
Iran to use their online presence to both increase their follower base, and to spread 
ideas and interpretations of jurisprudence. While this new online medium has been 
claimed in the Iranian context as a way to change the dynamic between cleric and 
followers by making a playful arena whereby clerics can interact with their 
followers directly, I social media is being used very differently by shi'a religious 
movements within the Gulf region. 
This rise in social and new media use by shi'a actors and groups should not 
be understood as an isolated incident, rather, it is symptomatic of a larger network 
of interconnected issues that have come to frame shi'a identity politics in the 
context of the modern Gulf. It is also important, then, to examine this uptake in 
sectarian rhetoric across new media technologies through more than just a media 
analysis. Despite the fact that this conversation is behind held on and made possible 
by the proliferation of social and new media, the reasons behind these observations 
span the disciplines of politics, economics, religion, and identity. It is the aim of this 
thesis to be interdisciplinary, and as such the boundaries between topics and fields 
of study are not always clearly demarcated. Chapters generally correspond to a 
research question, though areas of overlap between ideas abound. It is hoped that 
this will be understood as a strengthener to the ideas in this thesis, rather than 
detracting from it. 
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It is the aim of this thesis to more fully understand the aforementioned 
phenomenon, through a more thorough examination of the factors that have 
contributed to its formation. This will be done by addressing three main research 
questions, which shall be subsequently analyzed and discussed. In reference to the 
widespread increase in sectarianism and sectarian rhetoric across the region, the 
first research question asks: What are the main contributing factors to the rise in 
sectarianism and sectarian rhetoric across the Gulf region? Answering this question 
requires an analysis of the politics of instability that have continuously rocked the 
region in recent history, coupled with the economic boom brought on by the 
discovery of oil. Processes of state formation will also be analyzed in the hopes of 
explaining some elements of sectarianism via structural anomalies unique to each 
country. Perhaps the most relevant to the first research question, how the Gulf 
states have mis/managed identity will also be explored. The proposed answers to 
this research question can be found mostly in the first two chapters. 
Upon having understood the reasons behind the region's increase in 
sectarianism and sectarian rhetoric, the thesis shall turn to examining the 
consequences of these developments. In deference to academic jargon, the second 
research question can be read as: What have been the outcomes of the sectarianism 
observed in the discussion of the first research question? The bulk of the response 
lo this question can be found in the second and third chapters, where some overlap 
Invariably occurs with the preceding and forthcoming research questions. It is 
observed that technology, especially new media, has had a critical role in the spread 
f sectarian rhetoric, and some explanations as to why this may be the case are 
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outlined in the subsections of the second chapter. A deeper exploration of the role of 
technology and globalization is featured in the third chapter. 
The major observation made in the exploration of the second research 
question is that shi'a in the Gulf have taken to new media, especially social media, in 
earnest. Discussed briefly at the opening of this thesis, this represents a unique 
phenomenon within the regional context. Though social media use in the Gulf is 
widespread amongst the vast majority of the population, it seems that shi'a and 
other marginalized groups have taken to social media with a heightened fervor. 
Having addressed some of the possible explanations for this observation, the third 
research question deals exclusively with the use of social and new media by shi'a in 
the Gulf: What observations can be made in regards to this increased use of social 
and new media by shi'a in the Gulf? The fourth and fifth chapters will more deeply 
explore this question, with sections of new data analysis included and observations 
drawn from an in-depth study of shi'a content on social media platforms. 
It is hoped that the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis will lend itself 
more fully to the understanding that the observations made forthwith cannot be 
understood in an isolated context. The events leading up to and influencing the 
observations made are part of a larger grid that has shaped events in the Gulf today. 
This paper does not approach the topic of policy prescription or suggestion, it only 
,tims to examine, understand, and explain sectarianism and sectarian rhetoric from 
,m academic perspective. This thesis shall conclude by reiterating the most 
mportant arguments made throughout, and by broaching possibilities for further 
t •search into shi'a identity politics within the Gulf region. 
Tumultuous waters: Identity politics during times of political 
instability in the Gulf 
While the Gulf does not exist in isolation from the rest of the Middle East, the 
region was lucky enough to experience a unique form of quietude in the years 
directly preceding the Arab Spring moment of 2011. While we now know such an 
ideal situation was bound to come to an end, it seems that Gulf leaders may have 
become comfortable with a balance of power that was too good to last. Bolstered by 
the heavy involvement of the United States in Saudi Arabia following the 2001 
September 11th attacks, and the continued influx of oil rent, the Gulf States were 
lucky enough to develop politically, institutionally, and economically in relative 
peace. This was in contrast to the regional reality, where Iraq was in shambles to the 
North, sectarian tensions abounded in the Levant, North Africa was experiencing its 
own politics of opposition, and relations with Israel remained a thorn in the side of 
all Arab leaders.z 
Though the politics of instability have not been not unknown to Gulf leaders, 
indeed turmoil in Iraq, and even Yemen, threatened to spill over into the Gulf States 
from time to time, these states have maintained an enviable homeostasis throughout 
modern history. Though exceptions abound, for the most part the Gulf states have 
<.'x perienced relative political calm, characterized first and foremost by the absence 
of any major international contestations over sovereignty. This should be noted as 
un ique in a region where Iran and Iraq have quarreled and waged all out war over 
disputes in sovereignty, a region where militant guerilla movements have eked out 
te rritory throughout the Levant and North Africa. Although Kuwait's invasion by 
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Iraq exemplifies an obvious exception to the above, the small country was able to 
fashion a recovery once Iraqi forces had been expelled, and the decimated oil fields 
restored. 
Though this sense of relative quietude has pervaded the Gulf States in the 
past few decades, the rulers of these States have maintained a cautious and 
meticulous vigil over issues related to national security. Perhaps fearing the same 
fate as their neighborly nations, the Gulf States have spent billions in hard security 
partnerships with developed nations; characterized more specifically by the "oil for 
security" paradigm established in tandem with the United States. Weapons sales 
from the United States to the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have 
skyrocketed, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia now the 4th and 5th largest importers of 
arms in the world.3 This focus on military security arrangements exemplifies these 
states' tendencies to overinvest in hard security strategies while continuously 
failing to address softer security vulnerabilities such as the continuous burden of 
identity4, administrative reforms, or other aspects of human security.6 
The realities of shi'a trans nationalism have never been far from this intricate 
security matrix troubling the minds of Gulf rulers. Despite the fact that the shi'a are 
often singled out as a single threatening boogeyman, the politics of shi'a 
transnationalism are only heightened due to the suppression of identity politics on 
the whole. It is this complicated web of security concerns within the Gulf States that 
has worked to suppressed identity politics for the sake of prolonging regime 
. urvival. Shi'a politics represents but one aspect of identity politics in the Gulf, and 
other religious and ethnic examples abound. Despite this fact, the strengthening of 
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shi'a identity politics in the Gulf has been aided and abetted by transnational 
networks/ as well as the realities of international and regional "balance of power" 
politics unique to the shi'a situation. 
The strengthening of shi'a politics as a result of the 1979 Islamic Revolution 
in Iran and the subsequent export of clerical experts well rounded in political 
rhetoric was felt as far afield as the Levant and North Africa, and the shockwaves did 
not miss the Gulf. Serving as a political safe-haven for many clerics owing to the 
historically good relations between the ruling regime and the shi'a, many clerics 
from Iran and Iraq found themselves in Kuwait.8 It goes without saying that many 
clerics also chose to go to Bahrain or the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, an area with 
which Iran has tried to maintain a historical linkage. Despite this localization of shi'a 
cle rics to areas in which transnational ties had remained strong, shi'a laymen across 
the Gulf were emboldened on a micro level by the events of 1979, and protests were 
ommon throughout the region's shi'a communities during this time.9 
Religion and politics 
The intermixing of religion and politics is specific neither to shi'ism nor to 
the Middle East. Western and eastern civilizations alike have a long history of 
c:ounating religious issues with political ones, and vice versa. Even within the Middle 
U !Ste rn case religious overtones have pervaded political discourse for centuries. It 
I Important to note at this juncture that "the study of religion in politics is not the 
lUcly of religion per se but of its influences on the policies and the distribution of 
flOwer within a modern state,"lO as Roger Owen explains. For the purposes ofthis 
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paper, then, the study of shi'ism as a religion will not be undertaken, except when an 
examination of certain aspects of the religious beliefs are needed to more fully 
explain the manifestation of identity politics in shi'a groups within the Gulf. 
Despite the fact that most shi'a political actors strive for power and 
representation within their own national contexts, shi'a groups and their political 
representatives especially, have often been branded as Iranian "fifth columnists", 
and Gulf governments often waste no time in pointing the blame at Iran when any 
shi'a actors transfer their rhetoric into the political arena.11 Emphasis is placed on 
these groups' transnational ties, and one does not have to look far to find a cleric 
within any shi'a organization that has been to, or has relatives from, Iran. Though 
•mphasis is often placed on these linkages, they result more often from socio-
religious continuities than from any underlying political currents. Though various 
1 •volutionary factions within the Iranian regime promoted the exportation of the 
r· ·volution after 1979, it would be a bold claim that any and all religious scholars 
ludying or originating in Iran were products of Khomeini's revolutionary ideals. 
Though proponents of the Iranian model, or"Imam's line," can be found 
amongst the shi'a communities on the Arabian side of the Gulf,lZ to say that all or 
most shi'a hold their primary allegiance to the Islamic Republic is to ignore the 
historic multiplicity and diversity of the shi'a clerical institution at large. Making 
uch a claim would also ignore the fact that "the vast majority of religio-political 
tor·s behave as though their primary aim was to influence policies and practices 
Wit hi n one given system,"13 and also that "given their concern to obtain power and 
lnflu •nee in a twentieth-century context, the religious actors share, and want to 
seem to share, many of the same vocabularies and types of organizational structures 
with the more secular politicians within the same political arena."14 
So while transnational ties may have increased along with politically 
inflammatory rhetoric amongst shi'a in the Gulf after 1979, to say that all of these 
various groups and communities are enmeshed in the fabric of the Islamic Republic 
would be improbable. It is important to understand that there is a distinction 
between the tilts towards a more political discourse by shi'a clerics who had 
connections with revolutionary Iran, and outright allegiance to the Islamic Republic. 
That a cleric, group, or organization was influenced by the events of 1979 is not to 
say that those particular actors are in any way supportive of the policies 
implemented in post-revolutionary Iran. The main impact of the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran was not to win outright allegiance from shi'a in the Gulf, but to inspire their 
·ollective political conscience. 
Many scholars and clerics came to be inspired by the revolutionary 
movements sweeping Iran and other countries along religio-politicallines. Those 
s ·holars that had any contact, commitments, or study in the Islamic Republic were 
c ·pecially influenced by the politicization of shi'ism seen in Iran, and were 
111. trumental in politicizing religious rhetoric within their own domestic contexts. 
Scholars such as Musa al Sadr, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, Sheikh Ali Salman, Sheikh 
lttiSSan al Saffar, and Mohamed al Shirazi are all examples of shi'a clerics with ties to 
lr. n (through birth, education, or association) who successfully translated the 
r volutionary rhetoric of Iranian shi'a politics to their domestic contexts. Rather 
th tn alling for outright accession to the Iranian state as a source of political and 
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religious legitimacy, these clerics have manipulated domestic political scenes to 
promulgate their own understandings of religious politics. In some cases, these 
clerics have inspired political shi'a movements that are virulently opposed to the 
teachings of the Iranian state.1s 
These facts lead to the violent suppression of many shi'a political actors in 
the Gulf across the 1980s and 1990s, where the Gulf regimes conflated any 
politicization of local shi'a with a direct threat to state sovereignty by Iran. Most 
notably, such policies were adopted by the government of Bahrain, and to a lesser 
extent in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. Having a history of vocally politicized 
·hi'a movements, Bahrain was weary of any opposition, especially if it was lead by a 
harismatic cleric. The AI Khalifa dynasty exiled many such shi'a political actors, 
uch as Sheikh Ali Salman in the 1990s, though many were allowed to return later in 
2001, as part of a general amnesty offered by the new administration of King Hamad 
h n lsa. 
The economics of identity in the Gulf 
Owing to their relative regime security and abundant natural resources, the 
he Arab Gulf States were allowed to develop quite prosperously and generously in 
thoit· recent modern histories. Regimes were centralized and consolidated around 
Oll t• •nts, and Gulf governments learned to form invaluable webs of patronage with 
Uu newly acquired revenue streams. Following the lines of what has previously 
b n explored as "Rentier State Theory",16 these governments distributed rents 
lf ' tcgically to ensure political support from key actors, and to undermine the 
UJ)I)Ort of othersP The result was a hierarchical system of clientalism that still 
pervades modern Gulf state systems from top to bottom. Oil rents ensured that the 
government could provide employment to its citizenry in exchange for political 
loyalty, and the result was an unstoppable growth in bureaucratic and 
administrative structures within the state.1B 
While this rentier strategy worked for the Gulf governments in the short 
term and on a macro-level, on the meso and micro level these policies and "the 
distribution of revenue resulting from the sale of oil and gas by Persian Gulf States 
created an artificial sense of legitimacy and loyalty to the state, which failed to really 
address the crucial issue of identity in complex, multi-identity societies."19 Rather 
than addressing and accounting for issues of identity within the Gulf context, where 
identity has been traditionally understood as more fluid than current 
interpretations, Gulf governments used oil rent to develop infrastructure and satiate 
lheir citizen's basic needs and standards of living, diverting attention from issues of 
Identity they feared might lead to opposition to or contestation of the state system.2o 
More successful in some states than in others, this redistributive system 
became the norm for Gulf rulers, who chose to ignore issues pertaining to identity 
1Hid ethnicity in these heterogeneous communities. Despite this suppression of 
ld ntity in the recent history of state development in the region, in the face of 
de lining natural resource reserves in some countries, these issues are coming to 
the forefront. It is no accident that identity politics poses the greatest threat to the 
8t llc status quo in countries like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, where the state's 
diminished capacity to buy the loyalty of its citizenry has been matched by an 
llCI case in identity-fueled violence and a politics of opposition. Such a dynamic can 
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be most clearly seen in the events transpiring in a post-Arab Spring Gulf, where in 
lieu of monetary settlements, local authorities have often resorted to violence and 
political repression to silence dissenting voices. 
This upsurge in identity politics has also been assisted by the rapid spread of 
globalization, more specifically by novel information technology and new media. 
Where once state monopoly of a country's media outlets was common and 
unquestioned, citizens of the Gulf states can today access information about events 
around the world within seconds. Social media allows for the creation of online 
"nations",21 where citizens can connect with others in their own area or in other 
countries. This information free-flow has been detrimental to the ability of Gulf 
rulers to control access to information, and inspired the creation of strict internet 
laws, monitoring agencies, and censorship authorities. While the Internet and free 
access of information does not inherently lead to political discontent and opposition 
within a state, it does allow for that country's citizenry to become exposed to 
different state systems and ideologies, and for the opening of a public sphere where 
none may have existed previously. Gulf states have had to contend with these 
modernizing forces, and the perceived threat of new media and information 
technology has lead to the "securitization" of issues relating to the sharing of 
lnformation.22 
That identity politics transcended easily into this new world of information 
I chnology should come as no surprise. Where identity had long been suppressed, 
tmlthe politics of religious opposition such as the case of shi'a identity politics 
que lled, social media and the Internet have presented themselves as the ideal outlet 
for disquiet and the venting of political disaffection. Emboldened by the events in 
Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere, oppositional forces of all backgrounds in the Gulf 
took to social media in force during the height of the Arab Spring moment of 2011. 
Often even in communities that dared not voice public opposition in the form of 
street protests, political rhetoric and debate swept the breadth of social media 
sites.23 Except for Kuwait, where political dialogue and discourse had a place in the 
traditional settings ofthe diwaniyat,24 this kind of political discourse on such a 
public level encompassing such a large proportion of the citizenry was as of yet 
unknown to the Gulf States. 
Shi'a political actors followed suit, and the ensuing politicization of the social 
media presence of shi'a clerics and organizations is the subsequent focus of other 
chapters in this thesis. Such a topic cannot and should not be viewed in an isolated 
context, and the information above should serve as an explanation as to the ways in 
which shi'a actors in the Gulf have come to rely on social media as a tool for the 
th">semination of religious knowledge as well as the strengthening of identity 
politics. Understanding the context from which such a phenomenon has been 
Cl'cated is essential to fully understanding the impact that this dynamic has had on 
&he changing political context ofthe Gulf States. 
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Conquering Karbala: The shi'a in the ambit of the State 
It is easier to attempt to describe the experience of the shi'a in the Gulf from a 
generalized perspective. It is tempting, then, to make claims that the shi'a 
experience within the Gulf states has been relatively uniform, with 
oversimplifications between states easily made, and differences glossed over. This 
has been the experience of Middle East scholars recently, with many having delved 
into the various fields of Gulf studies as an afterthought, after having focused the 
bulk of their careers on the study of more traditional Arab political powerhouses 
such as Egypt, or the Levant. 
Though there are similarities between the various states of the Gulf in terms 
of identifying and explaining the experience of shi'a, significant differences between 
•ven the Gulf states should be recognized. This section will attempt to detail 
processes of state formation in the Gulf, and explain why such disparities exist or 
nre absent between shi'a and their Sunni countrymen. Current trends in 
sectarianism that differ between the Gulf states can be traced back to their 
l11 dividualized experiences with state formation, and the adoption of national 
t\U rratives prioritizing a hierarchical understanding of identity politics. 
The historical differences that can be traced to explain modern realities 
>e t •nd further than just explaining disparities in political and economic 
tchicvement between shi'a and Sunnis, they can also dictate levels of political 
H8.1gement in participatory politics, opportunities for political engagement, and 
II n perceptions of inclusiveness. 
These differing experiences have lead to different understandings of state 
security and its relation to identity, as well. Again, differences between Gulf states 
can be observed, some states have securitized identity to the extreme. Such a 
securitization of identity pits shi'a groups at the lowest rungs of the identity 
hierarchy, resulting in an alienation that is palpable in states with increased 
sectarian tensions.25These securitization strategies can be a boon to those rulers 
who are able to manipulate them to benefit the ruling elite. Frederic Wehry explains 
in his latest book that "in terms of governance, identity can be a resource to be 
mobilized or exploited by rulers. But it is also a vulnerability- a fissure that is 
susceptible to external ideologies or regional shocks."26 
These different strategies undertaken by various Gulf rulers have resulted in 
differences in levels of political participation as well, where some states have 
integrated shi'a into the fundamental workings of the state apparatus, where others 
have routinely denied their rights to participatory and representative government, 
disallowing shi'a to engage with the state on a legitimate political level. This section 
will explore these differences between states, and discuss how processes of state 
formation have encouraged the securitization of identity, how governments have 
often benefitted from an increase in sectarian tensions, as well as looking at 
diffe rences in political engagement between states. 
Processes of state formation in the Gulf 
Though examining processes of state formation may seem basic or 
udlmentary, the review of certain important details is paramount to the further 
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exploration of sectarian rhetoric in the Gulf. The choices that governments have 
made since the early 19th century onwards have had tremendous consequences for 
their populations as well as the character of the varying state apparatuses in the 
region. It is hoped that by examining the different state building techniques in the 
Gulf, a point about the relevance of these processes to current sectarian realities can 
be made. Though an analysis of these historical process could also lend itself to the 
correction of these disparities in the future, such policy prescriptions remain little 
but conjecture within the framework of the current regional reality. 
Certain states in the Gulf can be said to have engaged in plural processes of 
state formation, where representatives of multiple identities (and the groups that 
represent them) where included, consulted, and/or encouraged to participate in 
state-crafting. Such a strategy can achieve a stable balance between identities in a 
plural society, by coopting the loyalty of various groups by encouraging or forcing 
them to take a stake in the creation of the state apparatus. Strategies based upon 
this pluralistic understanding of identity were adopted by Gulf states such as Oman 
.md Kuwait, where shi'a groups have historically been closely linked to the tribal 
t uling eliteP 
In such states, the shi'a groups have held positions of economic power owing 
o their centrality as the state's primary merchant class, brokering trade between 
lr.m, India, the rest of the Gulf, and others.2BTraditionally, these merchants were 
Interested less in ruling themselves, preferring to outsource the responsibilities of 
ovcrnment all too often to Bedouin tribes, traditionally much more skilled in the 
t l of combat, war-making, and protection of the population.29 This is not to say that 
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the shi'a merchant classes were completely separate and uninterested in who was 
governing them, on the contrary; these merchant shi'a would often influence 
domestic and foreign policy within their state systems.For example, it has been 
common practice for the Kuwaiti ruling elite to routinely appoint a shi'a 
undersecretary as an integral part of the cabinet. Even when this appointment 
became a source of contention throughout the years, the ruling elite continued to 
maintain the position.Jo 
The opposite of this strategy of inclusion, which most Gulf states employed to 
a certain degree, can be contrasted by another strategy - that of identity 
suppression, often violent. States that employed repression of shi'a identity as a 
ruling strategy, such as the Kingdom of Bahrain, chose to repress, alienate, and 
marginalize shi'a populations in order to create a homogenous, and highly stable, 
ruling elite class. Rather than basing plans for political stability on the pluralistic 
inclusion of different groups in state formation processes, Gulf states such as 
U.thrain chose instead to exclude those not conforming to the dominant state 
n.trrative, a narrative that prioritizes tribal, Sunni identity above the cosmopolitan 
hi 'ism endemic to the island state.31 
Though both strategies often proved highly successful in their various states, 
the repercussions of the decisions taken by ruling elites along these lines in the state 
build ing process set in motion events that would carry on to the present day. In 
lti lc:s where repression was employed as a tactic, identity took on an increased 
Importance in the political, economic, and social realms of the state. Often in these 
l 1 cs, rather than the shi'a groups giving in to state brokered tactics of repression, 
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these shi'a groups came to be understood as more violent and antagonistic than 
their co religionists in Oman or Kuwait. Juan Cole argues of these militant shi'a 
groups that "much of what the outside world has understood as activism and 
militancy among [Arab] Shi'ites after about 1975 has been a manifestation of 
attempts to find political representation in their various nations as an ethnic and 
religious community."3Z 
It is ironic, then, that those states which have chosen to employ tactics of 
identity suppression, especially as it relates to their shi'a populations, have 
experienced the most identity-fueled violence in their modern histories. States like 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, countries with significant shi'a populations that the ruling 
elites thought to marginalize and alienate, routinely face more continuous bouts of 
oppositional politics based on claims of identity than Oman, which also has an 
influential shi'a population, to illustrate the point. 
The securitization of identity 
Despite the fact that threat perceptions between Gulf states can differ, it is 
c; l •ar that Gulf governments share a common definition and understanding of 
ccurity, and its relationship to the state's ruling elite. Wehrey explains in the 
op •ning pages of his newest work that "the Gulf Arab states are united by a shared 
I)Ct'ception of threat and a shared discourse on security. For Gulf ruling elites, 
n \tional security is frequently conflated with regime security, and the lines between 
CHCtomal and internal security are similarly blurred."33 Gulf rulers have often used 
thl understanding of security to legitimize their policies based upon a securitized 
understanding of identity, where increasingly "the management of Shi'i populations 
is conceived increasingly as a security problem demanding concerted regional 
cooperation rather than a political issue to be solved in local political 
frameworks."34 
Since 1979, the Gulf rulers see themselves as perpetually locked into a battle 
for regional hegemony between themselves and the Islamic Republic of lran.Js Gulf 
states are involved in what they see not only as a battle for regional political 
hegemony, but also as a contestation of their legitimacy to rule, and a battle to 
control the political center of Islam. In this vein, both religious and political shi'ism 
t~ re often conflated with Iranian political shi'ism, a non-distinction that has resulted 
n the branding of politically active shi'a actors and some groups in certain Gulf 
countries as radicals, or even terrorists bent on the destruction of the state.36 
Consequently following the success of the Iranian Revolution and its inspirational 
ffccts on shi'a across the globe, any attempt at political engagement by openly shi'a 
•ctors, especially those employing religious rhetoric, has been construed as an 
lll •mpt to subvert the standing political structures and induce a form of 
ov ' rnment known as wilayat al-faqih, the form of government in use in Iran. 
Such conflations are often detrimental to political advancement by these 
fO 1ps and within the larger state apparatus. Mostly, such accusations are 
n ubsta ntiated, and rely on the state-sponsored media to employ rhetoric that 
our"<tges a branding of shi'a political actors as radical, or increasingly "Iranian 
h columnists."37 In reality, shi'a politics in the Gulf follow a unique form of 
lllc 11 Islam that is often separate from their Iranian coreligionists' understanding 
pollti -. tl shi'ism. There are few shi'a political actors in the Gulf openly espousing a 
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wilayat al-faqih style of government; to do so would effectively truncate their 
domestic political ambitions.3B 
Though Iranian involvement in shi'a affairs within the Gulf is not unheard of, 
on the whole the Gulf shi'a operate independently of Iranian political shi'ism. 
Though Iranian religious leaders have been known to involve themselves in the 
appointment of religious leaders in the Gulf states,39 and have been accused of 
instrumenting assassination and coup plots,40 contemporary scholarship seems to 
concur that the shi'a political scene in the Gulf operates independently of the Iranian 
t' •g ime.41 Gengler explains how: 
"the actual or perceived emboldening ofShi'i communities ... is understood foremost as a 
ccurity problem, one requiring both local preventative measures as well as regional and 
nternational cooperation in defense of the common challenge posed by lranin-backed Shi'i 
Irredentism. The result is a vicious cycle in which exclusionary policies stemming from 
heightened scrutiny and suspicion of Shi'i citizens only further aggravate existing political 
8' levances, spurring increased activism that in turn reinforces state fears and, from the 
l itte r's perspective, confirms the need for precisely the sort of preventative policies that are 
the sources ofShi'i complaint."4Z 
Such an understanding of the securitization of identity, coupled with these 
r rnc's perception of state security have resulted in a toxic political environment 
I VOI'I ng political engagement by those whose ascriptive characteristics (tribe, sect, 
) most closely match the ruling elite. This understanding of identity results in a 
f 11 chical ranking of identities, with those citizens perceived to be most loyal 
n those most closely resembling the ascriptive characteristics of the ruling elite. 
undeniably lauds Gulf Arab shi'a the lowest possible rankings on this 
rchlcalloyalty scale. This hierarchical identity securitization scheme denies 
shi'a the possibility of engaging in legitimate politics, as they are assumed to be 
disloyal owing solely to their sectarian affiliation. 
Justin Gengler provides a superb explanation of why such distinctions have 
become so salient in the modern Gulf: "a political environment in which others' 
policy views are not easily identifiable, combined with an economic environment 
that promotes individual rather than collective pursuits of material resources, 
works to privilege political coordination on the basis of ascriptive social groupings, 
rather than cross-societal programmatic coalitions."43 This results in a 
compounding problem, where the citizenry increases their political affiliations along 
ascriptive characteristics, and the ruling regimes further divide the population along 
these lines, exacerbating many of these groups' grievances. 
Gengler continues, that ruling elites, "rather than [encouraging] cross-cutting 
ci tizen coalitions, [manipulate] electoral rules and procedures ... to ensure the 
continued political salience of ascriptive distinctions, especially those based on 
tribal and confessional affiliation."44 These divisions brokered by ruling elites are 
pawned on fears of regime security, and the perceived threat of Iranian 
•ncroachment. "As a result," Gengler again explains, "not only are the experiences 
nnd heritage of some citizens not represented in official state doctrine, but these 
cltizens ... lack the background necessary to share in traditional expressions of 
up port for political elites qua co-religionists or qua leaders of an extended national 
,, b •."45 
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Shi'a and political participation in the Gulf 
The above factors have come to define the political experience of shi'a in the 
Gulf states. Rather than being fully involved in state building processes across 
countries, the collective shi'a experience has been one of marginalization and 
alienation, in the political, economic, and social arenas. Though exceptions exist, as 
has been previously noted, it is safe to say that for the most part shi'a actors and 
groups have been denied legitimate outlets for political engagement, participation, 
andfor dissent. Blocking access to legitimate outlets of political participation has 
not suppressed the urge of these groups to make their demands heard, however, 
and such marginalization has served only to force these actors and groups to seek 
out non-traditional methods of political mobilization across their support groups. 
Such nontraditional outlets of political expression have taken a plethora of 
forms, from a widespread adoption of social media and new media tactics to 
d1 ·seminate political discussion and mobilization, to the implementation of violent 
ltld militant acts against the existing state apparatus. Some of these outlets for 
IWiitical expression remain harmless, with their only aim to activate and engage an 
nt ll·e subsection of citizenry that has been routinely denied an active and 
) u·tic ipatory role in government. Still other outlets, such as the militant youth 
0 tl tlons that became widespread in the aftermath of the 2011 protest 
tOvc ments,46 were destructive by their very nature, favoring a violent overturning 
lho ·tate system rather than effectively inserting themselves into the existing 
"' · of participatory politics. 
Still, legitimate political engagement by prominent shi'a actors and groups is 
not unheard of in the region, despite the tremendous opposition and challenges 
such organizations and individuals do face. Exemplary in this regard, the state of 
Kuwait has allowed for the participation and engagement of shi'a actors for decades, 
even when the actions of such individuals could easily be construed as dangerous to 
the understandings of security by other Gulf states. Even the battleground state of 
Bahrain has allowed for the existence of the shi'a based AI Wefaq political block, 
albeit the group's movements have been routinely scrutinized throughout the years, 
often resulting in a political backlash, with accusations of interference flung from 
both sides. 
Perhaps it could be claimed that the shi'a in Oman have maneuvered 
lhemselves into the best possible position in regards to their relationship with the 
l'1te. Though Oman's shi'a population is estimated to be no more than 6-7% at 
most,47 they are disproportionately represented in the upper echelons of the Omani 
tntc apparatus. Different subgroupings of shi'a are known to exist in Oman, perhaps 
lh most prominent being the Lawatis, who claim multiple top positions within the 
htHi ni cabinet.48 Not only are these Omani shi'a accepted within the government, 
lh lr loyalty is almost never a point of discussion, and it is assumed that they work 
n the interest of the Omani state. 
Why exactly Oman's shi'a do not experience many of the same exclusionary 
Uc •mployed by states such as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could be the topic of an 
r ly new dissertation, though a few theories will hereby be put forth. One 
po tlo n would be that Oman under Sultan Qaboos has historically placed less 
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importance on the question of identity, seeing it as (mostly) unrelated to issues of 
loyalty and security. As a result, different groups and individuals are left to devise 
their own ways of proving loyalty to the state. "Given the general context of 
competitive bidding in declarations of'Omaniness' [sic] and demonstrations of 
loyalty to the ruler, one of the current sociopolitical strategies of the Shi'a is to 
redouble their efforts to prove loyalty and justify their full belonging to the nation 
rather than to emphasize any distinctive Shi'i identity."49 
One peculiar outcome of this high level of political engagement by the Omani 
·hi' a has been their relatively unbridled freedom of expression in terms of religious 
freedom. One of the busiest areas of the capital Muscat, the thriving corniche area of 
Muttrah, boasts an enormous shi'a mosque, that openly sounds the shi'a call to 
prayer three times daily. The Omani shi'a are also allowed the freedom to hold 
'A ·hura processions near this same area, on occasion the government has allowed 
lhc processions to spill out beyond the enclave of the Lawati's shi'a neighborhood. 
Such latitude in religious expression does not come without careful 
monitoring of these populations, however, and the regime continues to closely 
\I t v ·y its shi'a citizens, and "the Omani regime, wishing to prevent any 
ml understandings and to show that it was not ready to accept any form of 
oll t tci1.ation of religious activities, [has] firmly reminded its Shi'i population of 
h tc the boundaries [stand] that [are] not to be crossed."50 The result has been a 
or shi'a actors and groups highly involved in their country's politics, while 
I U\Cing themselves from any significant politicization oftheir religion. So that 
I th · shi'a remain highly visible and influential within the Omani state, they are 
engaged primarily on a secular, governing level, and not on a religiously political 
platform. 
It is hoped that the illustrative examples given above can help qualify the 
experience of shi'a within the Gulf states. To say that the shi'a experience of political 
participation is uniform between countries would be false, and stark differences can 
be clearly observed. Through processes of state formation, different relationships 
and understandings of state-shi'a relations were developed by different states, 
ranging in a spectrum from inclusive Oman and Kuwait, to Bahrain and the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, which have instead chosen to repress political engagement by their 
shi'a populations. The repercussions of the decisions taken by regimes throughout 
the ir state building processes can still be felt in the modern political arenas of each 
Sl<t te. In those states that have chosen repression as a tactic to manage the perceived 
curity threat of shi'a identity, there has been a decisive shift from an attempt to 
gain a foothold within legitimate participatory politics, to the adoption of 
nuntraditional political avenues for dissent and discussion. 
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The Gulf and globalization 
In 2005 Thomas Friedman famously proclaimed: "the world is flat."S 1 
Friedman elaborated more fully that globalization was now in it's third pass, and 
was reducing the size of the world from small, to tiny and flat. He argued that 
playing fields were becoming more level across the globe, and that the rise of 
nonwhite, nonwestern populations would be spearheading the next phase of 
globalization. Though the social networking site Twitter was only just beginning to 
blossom in 2005, Friedman may have been dully impressed at the site's rate of 
uptake in the Middle East. It could be claimed that the Arab states are the champions 
of social media globalization, boasting some of the highest usage rates in the 
world.s2 Exploring the reasons as to why the Arab states have triumphed in the 
realm of social media will be more fully explored later in this chapter. 
To remain true to Friedman's argument, globalization is not merely a product 
of the Internet age, and Gulf leaders are no stranger to the tides of Globalization 1.0 
and 2.0. It has only been with the introduction of new media technologies, the 
accessibility of the Internet and satellite television that Gulf rulers have become 
confounded by all of this novel technology. All of the Gulf states employ a certain 
degree of internet censorship, with much of the technology being supplied by 
ompanies with design firms in the Silicone Valley of California. 53 This is all 
occurring in the midst of a democratic age in which the USA has routinely called for 
more openness in information sharing and less media censorship in the Middle East, 
II the while profiting from these countries' desires to censor new media content. 
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Despite the fact that all of the Gulf governments employ a degree of content 
censorship, and that certain rhetoric or topics of discussion remain taboo for 
citizens in the Gulf, it seems that the groups that have taken to social and new media 
most vehemently have been those marginalized populations as described in the 
previous chapter. These groups have spearheaded the region's growth in social and 
new media by using these platforms to engage in dialogue and rhetoric that would 
otherwise be unsafe for them to express publicly on the streets. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that social media and other new media technologies were at the 
forefront of the protest movements that reached the shores of the Gulf in 2011. 
Toby Matthiesen recounts in his detailed description of the events following 
the February 2011 protest movements in Bahrain how television screens in the 
Pearl Roundabout had been set up to broadcast shi'a religious and political content 
from Kuwait, Lebanon, and lran.s4 Much of this content couched disguised or blatant 
criticism of the Bahraini ruling family's style of government, and shortly thereafter 
the government employed censorship of these channels, in an attempt to stop or 
interrupt their transmission within Bahrain. It is also telling that in 2014, the 
Bahraini government (and other Gulf governments as well) chooses to broadcast its 
breaking news, especially as it relates to protests and the suppression of 
oppositional politics, on the Ministry of Interior's Twitter feed - both in Arabic and 
n English.ss 
It should come as little shock, then, to understand that shi'a actors and 
roups have taken to social media in the Gulf in almost a frenzy. These tools of 
Information dissemination and political mobilization have been a godsend for these 
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groups who go up against the long arm of the state when attempting to voice their 
opinions. Options for anonymity abound on the Internet, and it has become 
excessively easy, even for individuals with little technological background, to 
encrypt their data and mask their identity online. This complicates the job of 
governments who seek to target those individuals based upon their political beliefs 
or actions. 
Shi'a actors in the Gulf have also taken to social media perhaps in a novel 
way, considering the shi'a's long history of transnationalism and interconnectedness 
between various centers of political and religious authority. As shall be later 
outlined, shi'a in the Gulf have historically been very interconnected with other shi'a 
centers in Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon, and as such find the ease of communication with 
new media technologies to be in their advantage. This chapter will explore the ways 
in which modern shi'a transnationalism lends itself to the widespread proliferation 
of social and new media technologies. It will then aim to explore and explain the 
ways that shi'a actors have benefitted so fully from this interconnection, by looking 
more closely at internet use in revolutionary Iran. It shall conclude by examining the 
Gulf governments' heavy-handed censorship policies in the region, and their 
clttempts to stem the tide of new media and its usefulness in oppositional politics. 
Modern shi'a transnationalism surfing the waves of the Internet 
Much to the chagrin of the Gulf leaders, certain currents of shi'ism, especially 
Its political manifestations, may be more receptive to the powers of connectivity and 
In ormation dissemination made possible by the Internet. This is due partly to the 
marginalized status most shi'a groups in the Gulf are prone to, as detailed in the 
previous chapter. Much of this propensity to use social and new media can also be 
traced back to the historical transnationalism of shi'a religious and political 
networks within the Gulf and between Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran. 
It is no accident that many similarities can be observed between the ways 
that shi'a religious actors use new media technology in the Gulf and in Iran. Though 
pertinent differences exist (and will be examined more closely in the following 
chapters), it is undeniable that the models implemented by shi'a in the Gulf follow 
the Iranian example. Much of this is due to the ways in which revolutionary ideas 
were often transmitted and spread from Iran to elsewhere. It is important to note 
though, that shi'a in the Gulf are not simply retransmitting Iranian political rhetoric 
or content. On the contrary, the content broadcast by shi'a in the Gulf is their own, 
even though it may be based upon the Iranian model of information dissemination 
utilizing new and emerging technologies. That is to say that shi'a in the Gulf are 
transmitting religious and political content in the style of Iranian revolutionaries, 
albeit the content is keenly domestic, explaining a domestic political reality existing 
in the Gulf states. 
To explain this further, it is important to understand the ways that the 
Iranian revolution was broadcast, and its message disseminated to a large swath of 
the shi'a population in Iran and elsewhere. During the lead-up to the Islamic 
!~evolution in Iran, it was not uncommon for prominent shi'a clerics to transmit 
their messages via audiotapes. In fact, the widespread proliferation of audiotapes 
ontaining revolutionary sermons by such influential clerics as Ali Shariati is widely 
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credited with the success of the revolution in 1979.56 The importance of technology 
in the act of information dissemination has been recognized as paramount to the 
success of the revolution in the eyes of the Iranian revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
This potential was not simply seen as an historical part of the Iranian 
revolutionary tactic, it is clear that the new rulers of revolutionary Iran continued to 
support new technologies that could assist in spreading the revolutionary message. 
Such an open position in regards to technology seems to be singular to the Iranian 
experience, in contrast to it's neighboring Arab and Middle Eastern countries. 
Indeed, Iran was second in the Middle East behind only Israel to acquire internet 
connectivity. Unlike other nations that originally brought the Internet for the benefit 
of the state or commercial enterprise, Iran's internet was first brought for academic 
purposes, available uncensored to Iranian academic institutions. 
Later the Internet spread to the general population, as "the main attraction 
for the authorities, and in particular religious civic institutions like the clerical 
establishment in Mashad (sic] or Qom ... is [the Internet's] potential to serve the 
Islamic state as a forum for online discourse of revolutionary propaganda."S7 It was 
understood that the benefits of this could cut across national boundaries, claiming 
that global networked clerical institutions would see the benefits of this information 
sharing. Iranian clerics were not ambiguous in their support for the spread of the 
Internet, claiming that "the Internet, according to several clerics, is a 'gift to spread 
lhe word of the prophet,' and its potential benefit for Islam is immeasurable."SB 
The widespread use ofthe Internet in shi'a communities stemming from Iran 
.md elsewhere was, perhaps, not wholly ignored by the Gulf and its leaders, who 
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have traditionally securitized shi'a identity and politics (see previous chapter). Such 
widespread dissemination of revolutionary ideology via the Internet may also have 
struck a certain amount of fear into the hearts and minds of Gulf rulers, especially 
since content on the Internet in Iran remained largely uncensored until the early 
2000s. To this day, Gulf governments routinely censor shi'a religious and political 
content, deeming it either anti-Islamic, or a threat to 'national security,' (see the 
information in the last chapter of this thesis relating to the Lebanese Hezbollah 
news site al Manar TV). 
This natural propensity to utilize the Internet for the benefit of the 
dissemination of shi'a religious content can perhaps be coupled with a theory 
advanced by Hwang et al. known as 'media dissociation.' Babak Rahimi touches 
upon the role of dissenters in Iran's cyperspace, though the shape of Iranian online 
political discontent is, and should be, different from shi'a online political discontent 
in the Gulf. Media dissociation, in essence, relates to the ways that "the more [an 
ndividual feels [that] their views [differ] from mainstream media portrayals, the 
more motivated they [are] to use the Internet as an information source and 
ell cussion channel."S9 
As has been previously explored in the preceding chapters, a tight 
uvcrnmental control over the mainstream media in the Gulf generally marginalizes 
tho shi'a political, religious, and social perspectives. Not seeing their ideology or 
p 1 spectives reflected in the state sanctioned media, shi'a in the Gulf should be far 
more likely to seek out a sense of community and oppositional politics in online 
ll cc. The power that mainstream media exerts over political space should not be 
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underestimated. Hwang et al. explain that "mass media can exert social control over 
'dissenters'- those who oppose positions advanced by political elites through the 
media - by reinforcing dominant views and reducing their willingness to speak up 
or act on their political beliefs."6o 
In countries employing a tight grip on political rhetoric and the media, and in 
which a particular political viewpoint is advanced (such as the Gulf states or Iran), 
open political dissent can be dangerous. After the 2011 protest movements that did 
in fact reach the Gulf, the jailing, torture, or disappearance of dissenters was not 
uncommon. "Therefore, while politics has become more of a limited pursuit in the 
'real' spaces of everyday life, where decision-making is constrained by the 
authoritarian religious state and closures of news agencies are rampant, the 
Internet has opened a new domestic arena of contestation, accommodating 
numerous dissident groups online."61 Rahimi was writing in reference to Iran in 
2003, though the words could be applied to any of the six Arab Gulf states in the 
years after 2011, a time comparable to the widespread student protests in Iran 
during the early 2000s. 
Rahimi essentially describes the concept of media dissociation and its 
applicability to the lraian political scene, though the concept advanced by Hwang et 
,ll. would not surface on the academic circuit for another three years. By examining 
hoth of these viewpoints, it becomes clear that those with a higher tendency 
t >wards media dissociation would be more likely to engage in online political 
d sent within the context of the Gulf. An additional layer of complexity can be 
dded to the experience of political dissenters in the Gulf however, by 
understanding the importance attached to identity politics and identity hierarchies 
in many of the Gulf states. Individuals could perceive themselves (and/or be 
perceived by others) to be political dissenters based solely upon their sectarian, 
tribal, or other ascriptive affiliation. Such an understanding of media dissociation 
coupled with the realities of identity politics in the context of the Gulf may help to 
explain why shi'a actors and groups in the Gulf have flourished on social and new 
media platforms. 
Despite the fact that Gulf governments have tried their utmost to stifle 
political dissent in all its forms, including online content, the very nature of cyber-
dissent makes it almost impossible to quash. In Iran and in the Gulf, even if"the 
state attempts to circumscribe diverse forms of dissent online, opposition emerges 
in the most invisible and indirect ways to undermine regulation."62 That is to say, it 
becomes almost impossible for governments to fully eliminate online oppositional 
politics, as online activists around the globe are always devising new strategies of 
circumvention, and cyberspace remains a much safer avenue for political expression 
than forthright, public action in most Gulf states. These facts are understood by the 
hi'a in the Gulf, and the unique ways that shi'a in the Gulf have used tools of online 
dissent shall be further explored in the following chapter. 
Government censorship in the Gulf 
"Best viewed as an early response to the accumulating internal pressures in 
the Gulf monarchies, coupled with a lack of transparency associated with prevailing 
llOI tical structures, there has been a dramatic increase in censorship in the region," 
Chr• stopher Davidson boldly stresses in his latest work. In a post-Arab Spring Gulf, 
37 
an increase in government censorship is palpable. Despite the hopeful claims made 
by many upon the introduction of the Internet in the Arab world, and especially 
after seeing the modernizing and liberalizing trends it unleashed on countries like 
Tunisia and Egypt, censorship in the Gulf has increased tenfold since the first decade 
of the 2000s has passed. 
Though broad-ranging internet censorship legislation was often proposed 
and implemented in some countries long before the actual "Arab Spring moment" 
that began in the first few months of 2011, government control over internet 
content in the Gulf has surged in recent years, with Gulf governments unleashing 
modifications and broad reforms over traditional and new media alike.63 Hoping to 
stifle dissent from all sides, the Gulf governments have made it a point of exercising 
control over media whenever possible. Often this is coupled with intimidation 
strategies, whereby high profile arrests of online dissidents are publicly aired and 
discussed on state-backed media.64 
The targeting of both religious and political shi'a actors for censorship and 
propaganda purposes has often been the target of government media outlets, 
especially in those countries at the forefront of the battle with an upsurge in shi'a 
Identity politics; namely Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Specifically addressing the 
online activism of Bahraini shi'a dissidents, the Bahraini government stated in late 
201 0 that it would no longer tolerate unrest amongst the shi'a, or the "slandering of 
lh • nation."6S 
Examples abound outside of Bahrain, and suppression of shi'a identity in the 
hgious sphere can be seen distinctly in Saudi Arabia as well. Leading up to the 
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"Arab Spring moment", for example, again in late December 2010 a group of shi'a 
were reportedly attacked in the Saudi Arabian holy city of Medina. Though security 
forces disbanded the violence, and "state-backed newspapers reported the attacks, 
they eschewed mention of the sectarian element, with [the AI Riyadh newspaper] 
even blaming 'young zealots wearing black clothes'- in a reference to Shi'a 
worshippers - for inciting the violence."66 
Such extreme levels of censorship and propaganda to suppress any mention 
or acknowledgement of shi'a identity have compounded the existing pressures 
mounting on shi'a actors in the Gulf. Intimidation and imprisonment of journalists 
and activists, not least of which has targeted online actors, has silenced many in the 
region. By limiting the freedom of expression of these groups and individuals, the 
government has acted to channel their perceived religious and political 
discrimination into the only channels left at their disposal to help disseminate their 
messages and celebrate their identity: social media platforms. 
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Social media and shi'a identity politics: A globalized model with 
regional ramifications 
Of the many interesting particularities that have come to characterize the 
Gulf, one of the most influential would have to be the region's meeting with 
modernity. What some would characterize as a "clash of civilizations,"67 the Gulf 
region has had a tumultuous time enmeshing itself into the fabric of the globalized 
world. The ways in which globalization has come to effect the region are numerous, 
not least of which is the way in which new media has created platforms for minority 
groups to express themselves, and for the proliferation of identity politics. The Gulf 
States themselves are aware of the power that this new media provides, and "state 
appropriation of the means for mass communication [have been] a cornerstone of 
modernization strategies in the postcolonial period."6B 
Despite the fact that Gulf governments have routinely held a very strong grip 
on the flow of information within the region, this stranglehold has been broken if 
ever so slightly by the proliferation of social media. According to a 2012 report 
Issued by the Dubai School of Government, the Gulf countries account for over half 
of the total volume of Tweets in the entire Arab region.69 In 2012 Kuwait and Saudi 
rabia ranked as the countries with the highest volume of tweets in the entire Arab 
1 (•gion, with over 58 and 49 million tweets sent respectively during one month 
1lo ne.7° The result has been an online community that has become particularly 
lobalized and vocal, with some scholars attributing the emergence of online 
discussion on social media platforms to the growing consciousness of a "public 
Jlhcre" in the region.71 The same report indicated growing trends ofpoliticization 
t oss social media platforms, with claims made that in 2011 there had been a 
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"substantial shift in the use of social media from social purposes towards civic and 
political action" in the Arab region. The report asserted that interviewees perceived 
social media being used primarily for "organizing people, disseminating 
information, and raising awareness about ... social movements."72 
This globalization has also had interesting ramifications on the Gulf region's 
shi'a clerical institutions. While most of the population has taken to social media in a 
flurry, shi'a clerics and organizations have been no different. The intertwining of 
these institutions with the globalizing forces of social media have resulted in an 
interesting conflation of religion, politics, and public engagement that have had 
tangible effects on each country's domestic circumstances. Patterns of politicization 
are evident amongst both individual and organizational shi'a messages on social 
media platforms in the Gulf countries. Trends, that will be subsequently discussed, 
indicate that more than half of the social media messages transmitted by shi'a 
clerics and organizations in the Gulf are political in one way or another. 
This would indicate a marked shift in usage patterns of social media by shi'a 
institutions within the Gulf. Usage of social media platforms by shi'a clerics and 
organizations in the Gulf differ dramatically from the way these sites are used in 
lr:m and elsewhere. The existing literature documenting the ways that shi'a clerics 
use social media indicates a "playful" coexistence,73 whereby clerics use social media 
platforms to facilitate communication with their followers, promulgate religious 
louchings, and disseminate religious jurisprudence.74 This implies that clerics and 
or anizations based in Iran or elsewhere use social media to achieve primarily 
r I gious aims, rather than to spread any sort of political message or dissent. Babak 
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Rahimi cites the case of Mohsen Kadivar, an Iranian cleric educated at Shiraz 
University. Despite the fact that Kadivar is an outspoken critic of revolutionary 
Iran's Wilayat ai-Faqih doctrine, Rahimi suggests that Kadivar's use of social media 
has been based on a mission to further enable communications between the cleric 
and his followers in an effort to spread the faith and strengthen understandings of 
religious jurisprudence. 
While examples of similar behavior can be observed outside of Iran in the 
Middle East region more generally, such examples can even be found in the Gulf as 
well. Many shi'a citizens of the Gulf States maintain transnational religious loyalties 
to marja'iyya outside of their own countries. Lauer has documented this, and shown 
how many shi'a in the Gulf maintain religious ties to shi'a clerics based in Iraq or 
elsewhere, such as Ali Sistani and Mohammed Hussain Fadlallah.75 Both of these 
clerics, as well as others in similar positions, maintain discernable presences on 
social media platforms. While these transnational ties remain evident and quite 
fascinating, the ways that clerical structures in the Gulf have used social media is 
distinctive. 
The realities of social media use in the Gulf differ markedly from the above 
patterns of usage, such as those of Mohsen Kadivar. In the Gulf, shi'a clerics and 
organizations use new media technologies to disseminate not just religious 
messages, but political ones as well. This observation was made by thoroughly 
·xamining the social media transmissions of various shi'a clerics and organizations 
111 the Gulf over a three-month period (March- May, 2014)16. A purposeful sample 
of shi'a actors on social media was selected to further identify this politicizing trend. 
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A list of shi'a clerics was compiled through an examination of the existing 
literature on shi'a clerical institutions; this list was then further narrowed to include 
only those clerics that were based in one of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states. To further narrow the sample, only those clerics and institutions with a social 
media presence were further assessed. A social media presence was defined as a 
public account open on Facebook, and/or Twitter, and/or Youtube. 
Data was collected during this observation period in the form of screenshots 
(for Facebook and Twitter posts), and URL links (for Youtube videos). Data was 
collected in both English and Arabic. 354 individual messages were recorded for 
analysis. These messages underwent a process of qualitative coding, whereby posts 
were filtered into three categorical codes: religious messages, political messages, or 
religious and political messages. Only those messages that could be classified as 
both religious and political were further studied, as this should be considered as a 
novel use for social media manifesting itself in the Gulf context. 
Shi'a religious and political content on social media 
What the results yielded was evidence of a difference in the ways that Gulf 
h 'a institutions choose to use social media platforms. While shi'a individuals and 
01 anizations in the Gulf do use social media to broadcast a religious message, so 
lOU do they use it to transmit political messages. Over half of those messages 
tMiyzed could be classified as either political or political and religious. While these 
ndtc.ltions of a high politicization are significant, it should also be noted that only a 
m \II proportion of messages (12%) could be classified as purely political in nature. 
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While the compilation of country-specific statistics in relation to the collected data is 
forthcoming, many such political messages can be seen coming from shi'a actors in 
Kuwait. A purely political example drawn from Kuwaiti Member of Parliament 
Sayyed Adnan Abdulsamad's Twitter feed can be referenced in Appendix B, Figure 3. 
Perhaps more interestingly, 40% of those messages evaluated could be 
classified as both political and religious.77 Often distinctions between political, and 
religious and political content were miniscule. While the text of a particular message 
may have been purely political, the images or other media attached to the text 
conveyed a religious message. An exemplary tweet was posted to AI Wefaq's English 
Twitter feed in May 2 014, in which a purely political message in the body of the text 
is accompanied by a picture of protesters that can be seen carrying pictures of those 
killed commemorating them as martyrs, as well as holding banners with typically 
shi'a slogans.7B In this way AI Wefaq is tying their political message in with religious 
traditions, creating a unique blend of shi'a Islam and politics within the Bahraini 
context. 
Differences were also observed between shi'a individuals and organizations 
in the Gulf region. Individual shi'a clerics tended to broadcast a higher proportion of 
religious messages to political ones, whereas the opposite was true for shi'a 
organizations. These differences are understandable, as many of the marja'iyya 
would have undergone extensive religious training at home or abroad, and many 
hi' a organizations in the Gulf are essentially political parties formed under the 
guise or auspices of religious affiliations.79 Bahrain's AI Wefaq Islamic Society and 
Amal Islamic Society stand as obvious examples, and represent two of the shi'a 
organizations whose social media broadcasts were studied. Media from both 
organizations is often highly politically charged, linking shi'a identity to perceived 
political inequality and discrimination.so 
Even though the heavy influence of politics on the patterns of social media 
use by shi'a clerics and organizations in the Gulf is evident, it is important to note 
that most political messages transmitted by the observed sample were domestic in 
either their message or target audience. That is to say, that in spite of the fears and 
rhetoric espoused by many Gulf governments and regime allies,Bl most shi'a clerics 
and organizations are operating within a domestic context, and not an international 
or transnational one. Such an observation would be in line with previous 
scholarship on the issue of shi'a networking. Lauer has documented how shi'a 
politics can be at once domestic and transnational, taking into account the actions of 
AI Wefaq's Ali Salman in the run-up to Bahrain's 2005 elections. By obtaining the 
approval of Ali Sistani in Najafthat it was "permissible" for Ali Salman to run in the 
parliamentary elections, the party attempted to deploy religious identity politics to 
ecure domestic political gains.sz 
What this means is that any direct references to political events, situations, 
perceived injustices, etc. tend to reference domestic contexts and realities, rather 
han transnational ones. This observation presents an interesting possibility for the 
further study of the messages that these clerics and organizations are conveying in 
ctail. Regime propaganda often propagates the claim that shi'a organizations and 
hHiividuals are operating under the guise of an international or transnational 
f ligious authority, answering primarily not to their domestic polities but to larger 
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ideological networks. A preliminary examination of the rhetoric espoused by these 
organizations across social media platforms yields a different understanding, that 
these actors are more committed to influencing politics in their domestic spheres, 
rather than to the proliferation of a transnational, ideological standard. 
The fusing of religious and political messages by shi'a clerics and 
organizations in the Gulf display a few unifying characteristics that lend themselves 
to further inquiry. This section will attempt to show how religious and political 
messages are being blended on social media platforms, and the final section of this 
paper will address why this may be the case, and the implications that this religious 
and political discourse may have on Gulf States' perceptions of security in a post-
Arab Spring Gulf context. 
As has been previously mentioned, the intermixing of political and religious 
language is not specific to the Gulf or its shi'a clerical institutions. Telling 
observations can be made, however, through an examination of social media 
discourse, about the specifics of the ways that shi'a identity politics has been made 
manifest in the region. Just as the media policy of governments can serve as a 
barometer of liberalization tendencies,B3 so too the amount of political rhetoric 
espoused by particular groups on social media could be understood as a measure of 
the strength of identity politics in a country or region. 
Though many Isla mist groups of any ideology are want to use religion to 
pread political messages and vice versa, tactically, many of the messages 
ransmitted by shi'a clerics and organizations in the Gulf espouse a conflation of 
1 ligion and politics that is specific to the shi'a situation. What this means, is that 
shi'a actors will couch political messages in specifically shi'a rhetoric. This is not a 
phenomenon unknown to the study of politicized shi'a movements, though perhaps 
the use of this tactic as a tool for the diffusion of religious and political messages via 
social media is specific to the Gulf. 
A popular form of the intermixing of religion and politics is what Kamran 
Scot Aghaie has described as the "Karbala Paradigm".B4 Observed in revolutionary 
and post-revolutionary Iran, the Karbala Paradigm refers to the fusing of the story of 
the martyrs of Karbala with the political realities faced by a particular actor or 
group. Examples from the messages observed as a part of the aforementioned study 
include the labeling as martyrs of those killed in political protests or at the hands of 
government violence, calls by religious leaders to fight the tyranny and oppression 
of their unjust rulers like Imam Hussain stood up against Yazid, amongst others. By 
comparing the domestic political situation to the story of Karbala and invoking this 
Karbala Paradigm, shi'a actors in the Gulf can produce political causes that are 
intricately bound to a sense of religious urgency. 
Perhaps it is this singularity and specificity of shi'a myth making strategies in 
politics that most frightens Gulf governments, as it is so very explicit to shi'a 
Identity. Indeed, it is this inimitable aspect of shi'a identity that Gulf States have 
been eager to suppress and ignore, perhaps out of the fear that they do not know 
how to contain it, but through force or fiscal coercion. It is clear to observe that not 
II religious and political movements have been so ruthlessly fought, indeed Qatar 
thiS a controversial and well publicized history of supporting another religio-
pol tical movement, the Muslim Brotherhood. as Even Salafi groups are known to use 
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social media to spread a religious, and often political message, but not in the same 
anomalous way that shi'a actors have done. 
Fashioning a public sphere in the Gulf 
The public sphere was a concept first developed in and used to describe a 
situation in Europe emerging during the 18th century. At this time, the public sphere 
first emerged and was described by contemporary theorists, such as Jurgen 
Habermas. Habermas was responsible for much of the early development of the 
concept, although modern scholars have developed their own definitions as well. 
Fraser asserts that the public sphere can be seen as "a theater in modern societies in 
which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk".B6 Through this 
definition alone it becomes apparent that the public sphere lies at the intersection of 
politics, media, and society, by creating a free and open space for citizens to discuss 
matters related to politics, social issues, economics, and other issues of relevance. 
While the public sphere is well developed in many nations around the globe, 
the public sphere in the Arab world, and especially the Gulf, is in need of heavy 
construction. As Habermas asserts, the public sphere is not a given; it must be 
created, grow, and develop itself.B7 It is clear that media can be a powerful tool for 
this growth and development, and Habermas also duly noted that the "cheap and 
powerful" world of mass media often attempts to create a public sphere where none 
exists, and to manufacture consent.BBThrough this statement we can see that not 
only can media severely influence the public sphere, it can attempt to "manufacture 
consent" within it.B9 
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Relating this theory of the public sphere back to the state, Habermas 
continued on to explain that a strong public sphere within a society is necessary and 
essential for that society to check domination by the state.9o This is in line with 
other modern scholars who agree that the public sphere must be completely 
independent from the state.91 The public sphere should be a space in between the 
"sphere of public authority" (otherwise referred to as the "state") and the "private 
sphere".92 
Throughout the years there have been a few theories of propaganda put 
forward by various scholars. The one most relevant for this case, and indeed the 
most widely known and accepted theory, is the propaganda model put forth by 
Herman and Chomsky, and later expanded upon by Herman. It must be noted that 
while the model developed by Herman and Chomsky was meant to describe the 
media scene within western countries, most exclusively the United States, its 
application to the Arab world and the Gulf fits in a remarkable way. Indeed, the 
model itself can be stripped of its American and European connotations and applied 
to other regions with much the same results Herman and Chomsky originally 
enjoyed. 
Herman and Chomsky described five levels of filtering through which media 
content passes, which eventually shape the final product and perhaps more 
importantly: the message it conveys. These five filters include the advertising, 
newsmakers, news shapers, flak, and information filters. The latter will be the most 
r· •levant to this discussion at the intersection of society, politics, and culture in the 
,uJf. Perhaps the most important of the five, the information filter relates to 
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ownership of news media outlets. Put simply, the interests of the media outlet 
owners shape what information is published, broadcast, and/or released.93 
Otherwise known as elites, Herman proposes "the model does suggest that the 
mainstream media, as elite institutions, commonly frame news and allow debate 
only within the parameters of elite interests; and that where the elite is really 
concerned and unified, and/ or where ordinary citizens are not aware of their own 
stake in an issue or are immobilized by effective propaganda, the media will serve 
elite interests uncompromisingly."94 
While the propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky does not describe the 
specificities of the United States media system, it does describe larger, institutional 
forces that shape and control its output and content.95 Herman also shows how the 
propaganda model relates to democracy and democratic institutions. Herman 
explains that the structural factors shaping media discourse can clash with our very 
notions of democracy: "If structural factors shape the broad contours of media 
performance, and if that performance is incompatible with a truly democratic 
political culture, then a basic change in media ownership, organization, and purpose 
is necessary for the achievement of genuine democracy."96 
In combining Herman and Chomsky's ideas about the information filter and 
theories of democratization, an interesting intersection of elite political interests, 
societal issues, and media can be seen. Hafez aptly observed: " .. .it is the societal elite 
that seek to express political alternatives through the media. The media might be 
more effective in trying to articulate alternative views and mobilize people for 
transition when the expressed views are in line with specific political agendas or 
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existing groups or networks. The existence of a public sphere as such is not a 
sufficient condition for the political change; rather, it is the link between civil society 
and the media that is decisive."97 In this excerpt Hafez has aptly shown the 
importance and influence of the propaganda model on shaping and defining the 
public sphere. 
In light of all this previous scholarship, it has become evident that social 
media is playing an increasingly important role in shaping and defining the public 
sphere, most notably in the Gulf, which has some of the highest social media usage 
and penetration rates in the world.9B Contemporary scholars have often met in 
disagreement as to whether or not social media plays a prominent role in the 
dissemination and propagation of the public sphere in the Arab world. This thesis 
has routinely proposed that social media has a use as an outlet for political 
discontent and disquiet when conventional channels of expression have been 
suppressed or manipulated; in the ways described above. 
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New media and the old rule: The impacts of social media and 
identity politics on regime security in a post-Arab Spring Gulf 
In the years of the early 2000s, when the Internet was just beginning to 
flourish across the globe, hopes remained high that governments across the Arab 
region would be forced to liberalize media policies, due to the impracticalities 
involved in halting the flow of information on the Internet. Though this was partially 
true for a while in "liberalized" countries like Bahrain and Kuwait in the early 2000s, 
most of the countries of the Gulf did not allow for the establishment of the Internet 
within their sovereign borders before they were sure that they would have the 
technology and the ability to control its content.99 
Though censorship in most Arab countries was an ever-present reality since 
the beginning of widespread internet availability in the region, early censorship 
strategies employed by Gulf rulers tended to be based largely on moral standards, 
rather than political ones.too Such censorship would cover culturally taboo subjects 
such as access to pornography, sites promoting conversion to Christianity, drug and 
alcohol consumption, and gambling. "The primacy of 'moral' issues over political 
concerns helps to explain the considerable popular support that filtering enjoys in 
the kingdom [of Saudi Arabia],"lOl for example. 
That censorship would extend into the political sphere was inevitable, and 
the securitization of various ideologies and changing perceptions of security lead 
most Gulf governments to begin censorship of content often deemed politically 
'iensitive. Such censorship is not uniform, however, and varies substantially from 
ountry to country, and even between ISP providers within each state (if choice 
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between ISPs exists at all). For example, as of May 2014 the Qatari-government 
backed Ooredoo ISP (formerly Q-Tel) blocked access to the Lebanese Hezbollah-
linked website AI Manar TV (http://www.almanar.com.lb), though access to the site 
is still possible if using the country's only other independent ISP, Yodafone-Qatar. 
Implications for shi'a identity politics in the Gulf 
Owing to their malleable interpretations of national security, especially 
following the events of the Arab Spring, the countries of the Gulf have made it a 
national security priority to maintain strict censorship and monitoring of mass and 
new media channels.102 This has solidified a veritable state monopoly over official 
media outlets, leaving little room for the expression, development, or interpretation 
of identities that do not conform to the dominant state narrative. This has had 
tangible effects on identity politics across the region as a whole, not least of which 
has been the ways that shi'a actors have chosen to express their particular brand of 
identity politics. This combination of intensive state censorship, shifting national 
security prerogatives, and the quashing of identity through economic and other 
means has had noteworthy effects on the expression of shi'a identity politics in the 
Gulf. 
This can be coupled with the Gulf governments' ongoing reluctance to 
anction any form of dissent or popular participation, and has lead shi'a actors in 
the Gulf to adopt unconventional means in their chosen methods of political and 
1 'ligious expression. This stifling of official channels of dissent may have caused 
hi'a actors in the Gulf, and especially those in countries with a history of 
nfrontational identity politics, to move their political and religious discourse from 
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easily controlled and censored media to social media platforms. That is to say, 
unable to express their political and religious viewpoints in a traditional way, these 
actors have availed themselves of the plethora of resources available to them on 
social media. 
One of the hallmarks of social media platforms is that they are much more 
difficult for governments to control. It is impractical and often detrimental to public 
opinion to censor these sites wholesale, and as such these social media sites remain 
largely free from heavy-handed government censorship.103 Though governments 
may find it difficult to censor all social media content, more often than not these 
governments do monitor the content transmitted, and entry to some GCC states can 
even be barred for individuals whose social media presence reflects beliefs 
"detrimental to national security prerogatives."l04 Despite the high likelihood of 
government monitoring on social media platforms, many shi'a individuals that enjoy 
a higher public profile can escape some degree of state retaliation for the content 
that they chose to publish. The fact remains that "ruling regimes can no longer 
monopolize information as was the case in earlier times,"105 and social media can be 
seen as a dais for free expression within the emerging online public sphere.106 
Taking into account government monitoring and censorship of the Internet, 
t stands to reason that shi'a actors on social media may be couching political 
discourse in religious rhetoric in efforts to avoid repercussions from the 
sovernment. The censorship of religious content is perhaps more controversial in 
1\r'ab countries, especially in the religiously conservative region of the Gulf, and 
lte mpts to block material based on its Islamic religious overtones is minima1.1°7 
Perhaps more controversial than the censorship of political or moral content, loa 
religious rhetoric can be convoluted in its message and interpretation, which may 
make the job of state monitoring agencies more problematic when such entities try 
to decide what content to censor. 
All of these factors have contributed to the increase in politicized rhetoric 
from shi'a actors in the Gulf across social media platforms. Government censorship 
of traditional media has pushed the politics of identity expression to the margins of 
the new media movement, namely social media. Despite the relatively free 
expression such channels afford, government monitoring of social media sites 
remains an ever-present reality in the Gulf. The perceived threat value of identity 
politics and the threat of the spread of radical and ideological shi'a transnationalism 
has likewise fueled government incentives to monitor and limit the scope of 
expression for shi'a actors in the region. The result has been a notable politicization 
of social media messages and content published by shi'a individuals and 
organizations in the Gulf region, contrasting to observed usage patterns of social 
media by their co religionists in Iran and elsewhere. 
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Conclusion 
The Gulf states have been grappling most recently with a unique form of 
political instability that is unique to their economic and geopolitical situation. Due to 
their unique history of development, and the changes that can be attributed to oil 
income and rents, these states have had to make very controversial decisions during 
their meeting with modernity. The fact that such high levels of sectarianism and 
sectarian rhetoric can be observed in the Gulf currently should not come as a 
surprise, upon a closer examination of these states' policies during times of state 
building, and also in the ways that these states have chosen to manage identity 
within their national contexts. 
This paper has examined how the securitization of identity has taken place in 
the region's modern history, and the factors that have been implicated in this 
securitization process are many. Methods of state building and the crafting of 
nations can be attributed to the increased securitization of identity, as well as the 
processes affecting the consolidation of the state in the Gulf. When coupled with a 
hierarchical understanding of identity, the suppression of identity, a tactic widely 
employed throughout the Gulf, has had a significant influence on the securitization 
of identity. This securitization of identity has had notable repercussions, not least of 
which can be seen in the varying degrees of political participation by shi'a groups in 
the region. 
How the shi'a came to understand the state varied between countries, as 
some states adhered to a more inclusive idea of the nation-state, while others still 
focused on exclusion and repression in order to manage identity within their 
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domestic contexts. Some of the shi'a in the Gulf sought and were denied legitimate 
avenues for political engagement, while others were denied these chances outright, 
some never sought these chances out at all, and still other shi'a groups had 
opportunities for political engagement handed to them without ever being asked. 
In truth, the Gulf was met with a staggering amount of change all at once. 
While simultaneously becoming the center of the world's oil extraction endeavors, 
populations of the Gulf were encountering modernity for the first time, and their 
relationship to the state was changing, as sheikhdoms were consolidated and power 
became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a single family, tribe, or oligarchy. 
As oil came to be extracted, the economic situation in the Gulf was rapidly changing, 
with wealth beginning to infiltrate all aspects of politics and society. The final 
cornerstone of change came with the introduction of new media technology and its 
rapid proliferation. Radio and audiotapes soon gave way to satellite television, and 
eventually the tides of the Internet reached the shores of the Gulf. 
The fact that shi'a tend to place a high premium on new technologies is 
critical to fully understanding the substantial impacts that these technologies have 
had on shi'a identity politics both in the Gulf and in Iran. Perhaps to the chagrin of 
the Sunni, tribal leaders that came to associate Iranian revolutionary politics with 
shi'ism at large, new media technology has routinely assisted shi'a in spreading a 
religious message. Since the tremendous success of Ali Shariati's audiotapes in the 
run-up to the Islamic Revolution, Gulf rulers have been wary of new technology that 
has been appropriated for use in the promulgation of shi'a messages. Gulf rulers 
have recognized new media technologies in the hands of shi'a as a threat to their 
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own national security, which has become interlinked with issues of identity and 
sect. This, as well as the use of new media by other marginalized groups in the Gulf, 
have perhaps aided in perpetuating the Gulf rulers' continued distrust of new media. 
Censorship has become the name of the game for Gulf rulers who wish to 
allow the Internet and new media to be accessed by their citizenry at large, yet 
while maintaining a degree of control over the content readily available to them. 
This censorship, instead of protecting the mainstream political rhetoric espoused by 
the state, has in many ways agitated marginalized groups like the shi'a, who feel that 
new media provides them with their only real avenue for political discussion and 
dissent. As such, while the tactics employed by the Gulf rulers were intended to 
quell any sentiments of political unease, they have done exactly the opposite, all the 
while ushering in a new era of shi'a identity politics spurred by social media and the 
Internet. 
That social media use would become so widespread in the Gulf, especially by 
the region's shi'a population, should have been foreseen as inevitable. That citizens 
and marginalized groups should see social and new media as their only outlet for 
political discussion, engagement, and dissent was clearly an inevitable outcome of 
the policies employed by the Gulf states prior to this point in time. In a region where 
the politics of identity has become strained, and outright political engagement is 
discouraged, impossible, or dangerous, expression via social media becomes the 
only viable option for the region's politically active citizens. New media has become 
the sole outlet for discussion and dissent on issues of politics, economics, or societal 
i. sues, especially for those issues as related to identity. Organization along sectarian 
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lines is the easiest to accomplish on social media sites, where in reality a fully 
developed public sphere allowing broad and cross-cutting political parties is 
impossible. 
As a result, shi'a in the Gulf have taken to social media in novel ways. Though 
mirroring the patterns of usage and adoration of new technologies amongst their 
Iranian coreligionists, it is clear that shi'a in the Gulf are operating within their own 
domestic contexts, and only marginally engaging in regional or international 
organizational schemes based on sectarian affiliation. The high proportion of 
political as opposed to purely religious content espoused by shi'a in the Gulf on 
social media can be explained by understanding how the factors described in this 
thesis have contributed to the dynamic shift in identity politics we now see in the 
region. Issues of state formation and consolidation, economic rentierism, and the 
mismanagement of identity have all contributed to the push for political 
engagement along sectarian lines on new and social media platforms. 
This observation is indicative of a need for effective and legitimate outlets for 
political engagement and dissent for the region's minority and marginalized 
groups.The rise in sectarian political rhetoric on social and new media platforms 
should not be understood as a singular event, the flames of which can be easily 
tampered by instituting a new policy of further identity suppression. Rather, the 
observations made here need to be more fully understood as symptomatic of a 
wider web of issues spanning all aspects of life in the Gulf. 
From perceived or real economic and political marginalization, daily 
interactions with the state-sanctioned media, and trivial but palpable religious 
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discrimination as a result of the securitization of identity, the reasons behind the 
prolific rise of sectarian social and new media amongst Gulf shi'a are many. The 
implications of this phenomenon are hard to judge, though the trend does not seem 
likely to reverse within the contemporary sectarian climate that continues to be 
worsened by regional turmoil. 
Appendix A 
The following are examples of religious messages broadcast on social media by shi'a 
individuals and organizations: 
Figure 1: 
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Translation: "May the peace and blessings of Allah be upon the memory of Sayyida 
Zaynab on her day of martyrdom." - Sheikh Abdalkareem al Hobail 
Figure 2: 
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Translation: "Hadith relating to Imam Musa al Ka'aber: It has been said that he stood 
in front of the Kaaba and said 'what a great sight you are Kaaba, but it is a greater 





"The greatest ways to gain faith are to rely on God for the correction of your actions, 
knowledge, and beliefs; until you see the difference between right and wrong."-
Sayyed Hassan al Nemr 
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Appendix B 
The following are examples of political messages broadcast on social media by shi'a 
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Translation: "We are waiting for you [Nabeel Rajah] to continue onwards on the 
path of fighting for our freedom, democracy, and human rights."- Sheikh Ali Salman 
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Translation: "The parliament member Adnan Abdulsamad directed a question to the 




The following are examples of religious and political messages broadcast on social 




•Bahrrun suffers a lack ot consiStent accountability tor security otfcers accused 
of commttttng •HumanRights abuses pic twtttercorn/vxWMn401hc 
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Translation: "AI Khalifa cannot be expected to reform the system, because their 
stomachs are filled with haram, and Satan has made them forget Allah. Lies are their 
religion; negative intensions are their priority." - Sayyed Hadi al Modaressi 
Figure 3: 
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